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In-depth: Managing acquistions
It has become conventional wisdom that
acquirers suffer – by over-paying for targets
and then suffering post-acquisition chaos.
Indeed, there is almost a cottage industry
among analysts in decrying acquisition
problems, pointing to the ‘winner’s curse’ in
which the high bidder over-pays and then
fails to gain predicted synergies. At the
same time, newspapers and magazines daily
highlight failed acquisitions. If we based
our assessments of acquisitions only on
what we read in the academic and business
press, it would be easy to conclude that
acquisitions must be about to disappear
from business strategy as managers balk at
the risks.
Rather than declining, of course,
acquisition usage has grown rapidly during
the past decade. Global completed mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) value reached $2.2
trillion in 2001 as a result of over 21,000
deals, according to Thomson Financial.
Over 9,000 deals occurred in Europe, 6,000
deals in the U.S., over 2,500 in Asia, plus
many more in Australia, Latin America, and
Canada. Acquisitions are ubiquitous in all
developed economies. Although the $2.2
trillion of global acquisitions activity in
2001 was only 60 per cent of 2000’s record
high, the number of deals in 2001 reached 86
per cent of the 2000 total. Thus, the apparent
decline is primarily a reduction in the
magnitude of acquisitions, accompanied by
a much smaller reduction in their frequency .
Even when considering the value of
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Managing acquisitions 
to change and survive
In short...
● Acquisition usage has actually grown in the last decade, despite the economic
downturn.
● The apparent decline in the global number of M&A deals is primarily due to a
reduction in the amount spent on acquisitions, rather than a significant drop in
frequency.
● Firms that learn how to use acquisitions to facilitate business change often flourish.
● This article outlines elements of successful acquisitions by analysing the five pre-
acquisition strategies and six post-acquisition strategies.
by Will Mitchell and Laurence Capron
Conventional wisdom is
correct in recognising 
that poorly implemented
M&A’s are risky, but it
underestimates the 
strategic value of 
successful acquisitions.48
acquisitions, global activity in 2001
exceeded historic levels for all but the most
recent years.
Acquisition activity will remain common
even during the current economic slow-
down. For strong firms, such as Nokia and
General Electric, struggling firms represent
opportunities to grow product lines and
extend operations. For other companies,
such as the Archipelago and Redibook
electronic networks, mergers provide an
opportunity to change the terms of
competition in their industry while
competitors such as Nasdaq focus on
traditional operations. The core point is that
acquisitions are a strategic tool in all
economic conditions.
Why, if acquisitions are so problematic,
do managers increasingly use acquisitions
as an important part of their strategy? Is the
U.S. simply leveling the global competitive
playing field by exporting a bad managerial
practice throughout the world? Should we
expect a decline in Asian electronics
industries, for instance, because European
and American firms are buying companies
in Singapore? We do not believe so.
Acquisitions: success or 
failure and little in-between
Recent acquisitions are occurring for both
financial and strategic reasons. In part, they
reflect the greater availability of capital to
finance deals, whether to consolidate
declining industries, gain scale economies
in stable industries, or change businesses in
dynamic industries. As well as financial
market growth, though, the strategic power
of acquisitions is at least as great a driver of
the increased use. Acquisitions have been
central to firms such as Siemens, ABB,
General Electric, DuPont, Nokia, Nestlé,
Singapore Telecom and many others for
more than a century to gain new capabilities
and explore new opportunities that they
could not otherwise create.
Several of our recent studies speak
directly to the role of acquisitions in
renewing the firm’s capabilities and
businesses. A study by Laurence Capron
(1999) that looked at 250 European and U.S.
acquisitions showed that firms that use
acquisitions to reshape their technical and
commercial capabilities often gain
advantages. Karim and Mitchell’s (2000)
study of several hundred acquisitions in the
U.S. medical sector between 1975 and 1995
shows that the acquisitions helped firms
gain both incremental product advances
and substantial changes in product mix.
Their 2001 study of medical sector business
evolution shows that acquisitions and
subsequent business unit reconfiguration
underlay more than 65 per cent of the
medical products that Johnson and Johnson
introduced from the mid 1970s through the
mid 1990s. A study of U.S. nursing homes
during the 1990s, moreover, demonstrates
that nursing home chains changed the
operating practices of several thousand
facilities that they purchased during the
period (Mitchell, et al., 2001). The core
conclusion from these studies is that
acquisitions help businesses change what
they do.
Firms that learn how to use acquisitions
to facilitate business change often flourish.
General Electric has used hundreds of
acquisitions during the past two decades, at
times averaging more than an acquisition a
week, to change goods, services, and
business processes. Similarly, Nokia used
acquisitions as a primary driver in its
transformation from a Finnish resource
firm to the international leader in wireless
telecommunications. These firms would not
have become world leaders without their
acquisition strategies.
At the same time, acquisitions are
undoubtedly risky . Failed purchases are
common and sometimes lead to corporate
failure. Integration problems that arose
during Warnaco’s series of late 1990s
acquisitions, for instance, contributed to the
company’s 2001 bankruptcy . Compaq’s
difficulties in integrating Digital
Equipment Corporation, which it acquired
in 1998, led to Hewlett-Packard’s recent
attempted takeover of Compaq. Thus, the
conventional wisdom is partly wise –
acquisitions can cause major problems.
The unconventional truth, though, is that
acquisitions are one of the most powerful
tools in a manager’s toolbox, with the
potential either to transform a company if
the firm uses acquisitions well or to kill the
company if the firm uses acquisitions badly .
Thus, like any powerful tool, people must
learn to use acquisitions effectively or risk
damaging their work and careers.
Acquistion strategy
The remainder of this article outlines
elements of successful acquisitions strategy .
We  focus on two stages: assessing
opportunities and integrating targets.
Pre-acquisition strategy
There are five elements of pre-acquisition
strategy .
1 Identify responsibility for 
acquisition strategy:
Do you have people who live and
breathe for total acquisition success?
Assign responsibility for guiding
acquisition strategy . Clearly, acquisitions
strategy must involve senior managers who
will determine major objectives and targets.
In addition, a corporate development group
needs to coordinate pre-acquisition
assessment and post-acquisition
integration. The development group needs
to facilitate individual acquisitions and
create a coherent overall strategy .
Of course, most large firms have created
corporate development groups.
Unfortunately, though, many such groups
treat acquisition management as
fragmented series of unrelated decisions,
creating conflicts and confusion. A major
industrial products firm, for instance,
undertook a series of acquisitions over a
period of a decade primarily based on
uncoordinated directions from its senior
management. The latter wanted to pursue
aggressive growth but the consequence was
a company consisting of many units that
shared little common logic and duplicated
many activities. Corporate coherence only
developed later when the company assigned
responsibility for rationalising its
acquisition strategy .
2 Develop an acquisition vision:
Do you know what acquisitions will
contribute to what you want to achieve
as a company?
Develop an over-arching vision for your
acquisition strategy . This means that you
have thought through what you want to
achieve via acquisitions and have created
criteria for selecting targets. For instance,
in the early 1990s, Tyco set out on an
acquisitions-driven growth strategy within
four business segments – Electronics,
Healthcare, Security, and Flow Control. The
company set four acquisition criteria: a
target must be in one of the segments; must
expand product lines or improve
distribution; must offer excellent growth
prospects; and must use familiar technology .
The key point is to know what you want to
accomplish with an acquisitions strategy
and what target characteristics will allow
you to do so.
Part of an acquisitions strategy lies in
determining how aggressive to be.
Aggressiveness will depend on how much
financing is available, how much time is
available for integration, and how well
developed your integration skill is. Most
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firms need to digest purchases before
undertaking extensive new acquisitions.
Bank One, for instance, used acquisitions as
the primary driver of its growth strategy . It
undertook a sequence of acquisitions from
the 1970s to the early 1990s in which the
company would make extensive
acquisitions in one year, followed by a
period of low-acquisition digestion. Such
sequences allow time to integrate needed
parts and divest unneeded portions of
targets and existing businesses, before
undertaking additional expansion.
Firms that lack time for digestion risk
corporate bloat. Cooper Labs, for instance,
grew  rapidly in the medical sector via a
series of acquisitions during the early 1980s.
The expansion succeeded as long as Cooper
was able to integrate its growing set of
business activities. Continuing with an
unchecked pace of acquisitions, however,
the company surpassed its integration
limits and foundered. In other examples,
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have both
struggled to integrate several closely-
sequenced major acquisitions in the past
few years. Tyco’s recent announcement that
it plans to split into several independent
companies, even though the corporation
reported record profitability in 2000 and
2001, is a signal that it has reached the limits
of its integration skills and hopes to avoid
corporate chaos by spinning off the
segments.
3 Identify potential targets and 
price ranges:
Can you run faster than the market?
Identify potential targets that fit your
acquisitions criteria. High priority targets
offer you the greatest change potential,
either to improve the target or to use the
target’s skills. Simply paying for cash flow
from a business that you will continue to
operate unchanged  is rarely profitable.
Evaluate the price range that you will be
willing to pay for a high priority target and
draft a financing proposal. Begin by looking
for comparable recent transactions. Then
assess the value of the fit between your
existing business and the target. The fit will
arise through your opportunities to reduce
costs, create new goods and services, enter
unserved markets, provide superior
management, and change business
processes. To assess the ‘fit’ value, generate
scenarios of revenues and costs based on
possible combinations of your business and
the target business. Make sure that there are
enough cost savings and revenue generators
to justify the premium so that the target’s
shareholders don’t receive all the value the
deal creates.
Cost savings and revenue generator
synergies must be improvements beyond
changes the market anticipates each
company would make if the acquisition
didn’t occur. The market may also add a
premium to reflect the likelihood that the
company will be acquired, so that the
target’s market value already reflects some
future acquisition synergies.
The question then becomes: Can you run
faster than the market? Compared to other
bidders, do you have distinct skills to create
value with the target? Capron and Pistre
(2002) found that mergers created value to
acquirers when competitors could not
duplicate the synergy and its resulting cash
flows, which inhibits the competitive
bidding process. Thus, for acquirers to earn
abnormal returns, the difference between
the first and second most capable acquirers
matters more than absolute value creation.
As bidders’ capabilities become similar,
target shareholders capture most of the
value.
4 External contacts, due diligence, 
and offer terms:
Are you willing to commit resources 
to learn what your target really is worth
to you?
Contact the potential target. This commonly
takes the form of a letter of intent
expressing interest, followed by a meeting
with the target’s management. If the deal
appears feasible, pre-arrange financing
options such as cash, stock, stock swap, debt,
subordinated debt, mezzanine financing,
and seller’s notes. The financing options
typically lead to revisions in the letter of
intent.
Carry out a deep investigation of the
target and its fit with your existing
businesses. Due diligence commonly
involves both corporate development staff
and outside help from CPAs, law firms,
investment bankers, brokers, and
consultants. If this is a friendly acquisition,
then due diligence will usually involve
personnel from the target. If the target
management resists the offer, of course,
they are unlikely to assist. Although
unfriendly takeovers are more difficult,
both to price and to integrate, they often
offer opportunities for substantial valuable
changes.
We stress that simply relying on external
help for due diligence causes major
problems, because external parties
emphasise a target’s value in its existing
state. For change-oriented acquisitions, the
real value of the target depends on how you
will use its capabilities to improve your
existing capabilities or how you will use
your capabilities to change the target.
Assessing the change-value requires
knowledge of your existing capabilities and
innovative assessment of change potential,
which requires deep involvement by your
corporate development and operating staff.
Following due diligence, identify an offer
price and develop a detailed financial
structure. Prices may differ strikingly from
the range you identified earlier if due
diligence reveals extensive information.
5 Walk away when necessary:
Do you have the discipline to stick to
your top terms?
If a deal goes sour, leave it. Deals sour for
many reasons – there is insufficient fit
between your needs and a target’s
capabilities; target management holds out
for an unrealistic price; competitors inflate
the price; or competitive conditions change.
If you treat any one acquisition as part of
your acquisitions strategy, then you can
avoid over-committing to a deal.
Pre-acquisition activities are the easiest
part of acquisition strategy but raise
critical issues. Many firms fare reasonably
well at this stage, especially with the more
mechanical steps such as basic due
diligence concerning targets’ past activities.
Nonetheless, firms frequently struggle with
qualitative aspects of pre-acquisition
strategy, especially in setting a vision to
guide their activities and in assessing the
costs and benefits of changing capabilities
at targets and existing businesses.
We  now move to post-acquisition
strategy, where the most difficult problems
arise. Although some acquisitions fail
simply because they were poor deals – either
the wrong target or the wrong price – many
failures occur because post-acquisition
mismanagement dooms potentially sound
deals.
B Post-Acquisition Strategy
We  stress six elements of post-acquisition
strategy .
1 Create integration teams with people
from the target and acquirer companies:
Can you afford time and resources for
the nitty-gritty acquisition details?
Create two types of integration teams, a
‘guidance team’ and as many ‘operating
teams’ as necessary . The guidance team sets
the direction for acquisition integration,
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identifying initial goals and evaluating goal
changes as integration proceeds. Managers
from the acquirer typically need to lead the
guidance team, in order to coordinate
integration with corporate goals. At the
same time, a guidance team benefits from
support by the target’s senior leadership, in
assessing the target’s capabilities and
identifying how people from the target will
fit, or not fit, within the combined company .
Because senior management of a target
often do not remain long within the
combined firm, it is important to draw on
their knowledge quickly .
Operating teams carry through detailed
integration of target and acquirer
capabilities, following trajectories that the
guidance team sets. They can also help the
guidance team re-evaluate and update the
strategic direction of the integration as
opportunities that lie beyond the initial
objectives emerge in practice. As operating
team members, pick the people with the best
knowledge, whether they come from the
target or the acquirer. Indeed, active
participation in an operating team offers a
fast track for career development by target
personnel.
Corporate development staff members
play critical roles for creating guidance and
operating teams. Firms that carry out
acquisitions as regular parts of successful
change strategies, such as General Electric,
Bank One, and ABB, develop consistent
systems that they apply to their typical
acquisitions. The ability to bring standard
systems into play quickly contributes to
their long-term success.
At the same time, corporate development
staff must ensure that people do not follow
routinised systems blindly . Routinisation
creates major problems when firms
unthinkingly use standard approaches to
integrate non-standard targets. Many of
General Electric’s problems following the
1986 Kidder Peabody acquisition and Bank
One’s problems with the 1997 First USA
acquisition stemmed from failing to adapt
their acquisition integration systems in the
face of unusual needs.
2. Achieve quick wins: 
Can you fight to avoid post-acquisition
lethargy?
Long-term acquisition success stems from
quick wins. Finding the low-hanging fruit of
cost-savings, process improvements, and
market entries feeds confidence and creates
resources for additional integration. The
key point is to identify a big opportunity and
achieve it, then move on to the next
opportunity . Firms that assess all possible
integration options before undertaking any
integration find that the opportunities
vanish before the integration begins.
Many opportunities for selective
integration arise for quick-acting guidance
and operating teams. Combine related
products within existing sales forces. Sell
unneeded facilities. Adjust prices.
Rationalise sourcing choices. Renegotiate
supplier and financial terms. Combine
administrative services. Eliminate
duplicate operations. Increase run lengths.
Extend product ranges. Reinforce brands.
Reduce discretionary costs... Again, we
stress that integration gains can arise
without a complete initial over-haul of a
target or acquirer.
Clearly, of course, integration speed
depends on how well the acquirer
understands the new business context. A
distinction arises at this point concerning
the relative difficulty of integrating
exploitative and exploratory acquisitions.
Exploitative acquisitions are acquisitions in
which a firm reinforces its existing product
lines, production systems, and other
capabilities. General Electric’s recent bid to
acquire Honeywell, for instance, was largely
an exploitative acquisition, offering
opportunities to refine GE’s existing
instrumentation and electronics
capabilities. Similarly, HP’s attempt to
purchase Compaq is largely an exploitative
acquisition, seeking to reinforce skills in
existing computing businesses. By contrast,
exploratory acquisitions enter substantially
new areas of business activity, technology
or geographic markets. Nokia’s purchase of
a computing business from Ericsson during
the late 1980s was an exploratory
acquisition, which later contributed to
Nokia’s mobile telephone business.
It might, initially, appear more difficult
to integrate exploratory acquisitions than
exploitative acquisitions. Indeed, this would
be true if integration of exploratory and
exploitative acquisitions occurred at the
same pace. However, exploratory
acquisitions tend to benefit from highly
selective tapered integration in which the
acquirer only gradually combines the new
and existing business. Thus, the risks of
such exploratory acquisitions arise more
from longer-term corporate fragmentation
than from lack of immediate integration.
By contrast, exploitative acquisitions
usually require rapid integration in order to
generate the cost-savings and revenue
growth that arise from the complements
among the businesses. Integration costs and
difficulties are often high when you add
operations to a current product line or
expand an operation. For instance,
BorgWarner bought Kuhlman Corporation
in 1999. Adding Kuhlman’s Turbocharger
line to BorgWarner’s Turbo division
required more effort than creating a new
Cooling division as an exploratory venture.
As a result, firms initially often struggle
more with major exploitative acquisitions
than with exploratory acquisitions and, in
turn, require greater immediate integration
skill to manage the latter. One of the reasons
for the negative market reaction to the HP-
Compaq deal, for instance, arises from
concerns that the firms lack the acquisition
skills needed to carry through the deep
integration that the deal will require. By
contrast, the market reacted positively to
the GE-Honeywell announcement because
of GE’s successful track record in
acquisition integration. A recent study of
the U.S. medical sector, meanwhile, shows
that firms with greater integration
capabilities are more likely to undertake
exploitative acquisitions than firms with
lesser integration capabilities (Mitchell and
Shaver, 2001).
The key point here is that the quick wins
of selective integration offer a sequential
process toward full integration. Moreover,
exploitative acquisitions will require
particularly rapid sequential integration.
Thus, acquirers need to assess their
integration skills credibly when
considering a major exploitative
acquisition.
We  stress this point owing to the
tendency to view related acquisitions as
good and unrelated acquisitions as
problematic. While we agree that unrelated
acquisitions can create long-term problems
if firms do not coordinate exploratory
activities, we believe that seemingly-related
exploitive acquisitions create the greatest
immediate pressures.
3 Reconfigure both the target and the
acquirer:
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Will you challenge your own business?
Too often, acquirers emphasise the making
of changes at the targets, while ignoring
opportunities to change their existing
businesses. In a study of 250 acquisitions,
Laurence Capron (1999) found that the
target’s assets were three to five times more
likely to be divested than the acquirer’s
assets. By contrast, the greatest advances at
firms that develop effective acquisition
strategies arise from changing both the
target and existing business. Cooper
Industries, for instance, used bilateral
reconfiguration of its targets and existing
businesses to undertake major
transformations of its overall industrial
products corporation from the 1960s to the
1980s. Our study of acquisitions in Europe
and North America during the 1990s found
that the greatest benefits for capability
improvement arose when firms carried out
extensive bilateral reconfiguration, rather
than focusing on unilateral resource
redeployment to or from targets (Capron
and Mitchell, 1998). Operating teams need to
identify best practices, whether at the target
or acquirer, find opportunities to transfer
those practices to relevant locations, and
then create new capabilities by combining
those practices with existing skills.
4 Divest obsolete capabilities:
Do you have divestiture discipline?
Firms that carry out active post-acquisition
reconfiguration are left with unneeded
capabilities as remnants of the target or
acquirers’ original businesses. Divesting
such unneeded resources allows you to focus
on high-value opportunities rather than
divert attention to peripheral activities.
Unfortunately, firms sometimes avoid
post-acquisition divestitures because they
fear that sell-off will signal acquisition
failure. We disagree with this view. Instead,
divestiture following reconfiguration of
targets and existing businesses is part of
acquisition success. Firms that have
particularly successful acquisition
strategies are almost as active in divestiture
as in acquisition. General Electric, for
instance, acquired more than 300 businesses
between 1981 and 1987, while carrying out
more than 200 divestitures following
extensive changes to the targets. Indeed, a
recent study found that divestitures are
most common following substantial
reconfiguration (Capron, et al., 2001), rather
than being sell-offs of unfortunate
acquisitions.
5 Integrate people and align incentives:
Are you willing to share your privileges?
Targets need to become part of the acquirer
as quickly as possible. In part, this means
aligning incentives of all members of the
corporation, whether they have just joined
or have spent their entire careers there.
Acquisitions threaten careers of managers
in both the target and acquirer. Clearly,
managers will not carry out acquisition
integration that does not match their
incentives. You will need to adapt
performance measurements and rewards,
while defining transitional objectives and
longer-term goals.
In addition, acquirers need to create a
language in which people view the target as
an integral part of the combined business.
In a simple sense, this means renaming the
businesses as quickly as possible. In a more
subtle sense, you need to develop
communication flows that include new and
existing personnel. Cases in which people
from a target business continue to refer to
themselves in terms of their original
business fall far below their integration
potential.
6 Assess regularly:
Are you willing to challenge the ‘raison
d’être’ of your acquisitions? 
Finally, we stress that it is necessary to
review the success and failures of
individual acquisitions, as well as the logic
of your acquisition strategy . At least once a
year, firms need to assess the progress and
outcome of each recent acquisition. In
addition, you need regular review of the
vision for your acquisition strategy and the
responsibilities for managing the strategy .
Conclusion
Acquisitions are among the most powerful
tools for business change. Done well,
acquisitions can drive fundamental change
in how your business operates and provide a
basis for growth and survival. Done badly,
acquisitions lead to quick decline and
failure. We urge each manager to assess
their firm’s acquisition strategy carefully
and to help improve it where needed.
biogs to come
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